THEOLOGY

A MONTHLY REVIEW

VOL. XLVI. No. 271 JANUARY, 1943

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A Biblical Humanism - - - *Cosslett Quin*

Barth's Doctrine of God—Part II - *F. W. Camfield*

A Christian Idea of School Discipline *E. W. Edmonds*

For full list of contents see within.

Edited by Alec R. Vidler at St Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, Chester, and published by the S.P.C.K., Northumberland Avenue, London, W.C. 2.

1s. per copy. 12s. per annum, post free.

V. 46-47
1943-44

THEOLOGY

Editorial communications should be addressed to: The Rev. Alec R. Vidler, B.D., St Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, Chester. (MSS should not exceed 3,500 words, and should be accompanied by a stamped and addressed envelope.)

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CONTENTS

		PAGE
A Biblical Humanism	*Cosslett Quin*	1
Barth's "Doctrine of God"—Part II	*F. W. Camfield*	3
A Christian Idea of School Discipline	*E. W. Edmonds*	8
Correspondence:		
Calvin and Tradition	*J. S. Whale*	12
Book Reviews:		
Gregory Dix, O.S.B., *A Detection of Aumbries*	*E. C. Ratcliff*	14
W. J. Sparrow-Simpson, *The Ministry and the Eucharist*	*C. W. Dugmore*	17
C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost*	*R. Gregor Smith*	18
T. E. Jessop, *Science and the Spiritual*	*C. D. Waddams*	19
Shane Leslie (Ed.), *Letters of Herbert Cardinal Vaughan to Lady Herbert of Lea*	*A. R. Vidler*	20
Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*	*A. R. Vidler*	21
K. L. Schmidt, *Ein Gang durch den Galaterbrief*	*R. H. Fuller*	22
Shorter Notices		23
Notes		24
List of Books Received		24

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A Biblical Humanism

OUR attention has for a long time been focused on the conflict between prophet and priest. The attitude of critics to this conflict, as set forth in the Bible, has often been dictated more by their own feelings than by the actual data. That is because it is still a living, an "existential" question. There must always be tension between prophet and priest. In revolutionary periods one succeeds in liquidating the other. So we get the king-decapitating prophets of England, or the witch-burning prophets of Scotland, the heretic-burning priests of Spain, or the book-burning priests of modern Ireland.

But why prophets? Why priests? It is usually answered that they are Old Testament ideals, realized concretely by Christ, and imparted by Him to His Church. But Christ was also a King. How does that come in? According to the Old Testament it starts with Solomon's prayer in 1 Kings iii, 9: "Give thy servant a wise and understanding heart to judge thy people." He was answered with the gift of wisdom. And with that wisdom the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament came to be associated, however direct or indirect their original connexion.

The Wisdom Literature supplies a need. The Revelation has been made through the prophet. The priest, ready to kill the contemporary prophet, is ready to garnish the tombs and preserve the teachings of the dead ones. But the broad and general principles of the Revelation must be worked out and applied to the practical relations of daily life. That is the work of the wise man. He is not in search of a philosophy of life; he has had one given him. But by means of reason and authority he applies it to particular situations. He claims that his gift of wisdom and counsel is a royal one, by which kings reign and princes decree justice. But it is exercised also by nobles and all the judges of the earth; it extends to parents and the instructors of the young and inexperienced. And this instruction bears the name of "Torah," the same word as is applied to the law. Wisdom claims to be divine, heaven-born, an attribute of God, possessed by Him in the beginning of His ways, the agency by which He created the world.

The wise man of Proverbs is surprisingly free from prejudice. He does not stress blood and soil. He does not mention Israel or priesthood or prophecy. One might think him a mere cosmopolitan inspired by Egyptian writings. Yet he claims that his is a wisdom of revelation, not of discovery. He is this-worldly and yet religious, as only a Hebrew could be in the days when God's judgments were confined to this life and when there was little, if any, thought of resurrection. Yet his is a true and integrated humanism, for he never forgets that God is on His throne as ruler of the universe. He is urbane and good-tempered, save occasionally that he loses his temper with "fools." His ethical

tone is high; it is a sort of scriptural equivalent (which is not an equivalent) of the code attributed to Arnold's Rugby. Like that, it is a bit complacent. Yet it must be remembered in his favour that his recipe for dealing with one's enemies (if thine enemy hunger) was thought worthy of quotation by St Paul when writing to Christians, and enforcing charity.

In Ecclesiastes we see how far a man can go in Modernism (that old-fashioned creed) while yet remaining in some sense and to some purpose a believer. And then there is Job, where the problem of the sufferings of the righteous is discussed, not exhaustively, for the redemptive and vicarious side is missed, but deeply. The friends defend the traditional view. The Youth Movement, in the person of Elihu, intercepts and is politely listened to, but ignored by all. And then the Divine Voice speaks out of the whirlwind. Mere humanists may deride it as a *Deus ex machina* solution. Yet what other could there be? We can recognize Job's experience as authentic. Those who speak well of God must, once they have heard God Himself speak, abhor themselves and repent in dust and ashes. Yet even in their abasement they can be mediators.

When we turn to the New Testament we find that Christ was crucified by the Chief Priests and Scribes (those petrified fossils of the prophetic movement), and Pilate the suitably uncircumcized representative of Græco-Roman humanism. It is the Crucified One who is in the true line of succession. All admit Him prophet. He claimed kingship. His Cross shows Him to be priest, and the Epistle to Hebrews asserts it explicitly.

Our Saviour, in His teaching, adopted the forms of Wisdom Literature; He spoke in proverbs and parables. His instruction was practical in the main, though fired with the urgency and immediacy that come from Divine authority and the establishment of an eschatological kingdom.

His disciple, St James, wrote an epistle that is pure Wisdom Literature, an epistle of straw to the fanatic prophet, yet containing some of the wisdom that is from above. Here we find that wisdom has been democraticized and turned against the rich and powerful. The New Testament speaks of the Church as a kingdom of priests, and of individual Christians as kings and priests. There is no reference to prophets here, though elsewhere it is recognized that some members have the gift of prophecy.

Perhaps, therefore, we may claim that the Church ought to use her kingly as well as her priestly and prophetic privileges. We must be trinitarian here and insist on three elements, not just two. There is necessarily a certain tension between them, but all have a right to exist. In fact, where all three are present they supply the necessary checks and balances to one another. The kingly function being, even more than others, a possession of the Church as a whole, and not just of the ministry, has been difficult to fit in, and consequently ignored in theory. Political and social wisdom is very much a lay quality, yet priests need it, and should foster and encourage it in their flocks. We need the wise man to-day to witness to the true heaven-born wisdom

that is exercised by human reason and experience, but in the light of revelation and with the assistance of grace. It may deliver the "simple" of to-day from the "strange woman" who lies in wait for him with her meretricious wiles, whether she come in the form of an ideology or of a mere drift downwards.

It would take the pen of a Brilioth or a Nygren to define these three complementary aspects of the Church, to trace their up-surgings and their suppressions, their action and interaction throughout the long course of the Church's history. He might point out that Constantine was not so very wise, and also was not baptized. He might trace practical developments in the Cæsaro-papalism of Byzantine or Moscow or the Papalo-cæsarism of Rome. He might speak of Gallicanism and of the Royal Supremacy in England. He might find the wisdom element, ousting the prophetic and blended with some of the priestly element, finding its wigged apotheosis in eighteenth-century England. He might trace the harmful activities of the wise man outside the Church and show how necessary it is for him to be brought within it. He might find some connexion between the modern study of anthropology and sociology, and the Lambeth and Papal Encyclicals, and the new Roman Catholic feast of Christ the King, and the writings of Maritain and others.

It may be that the wise man is coming into his own. But he needs the prophet and priest; they can remind him that, awkward and responsible as their position is, his is even more so. In the Old Testament he is always in danger. Solomon may actually have been damned. Ecclesiastes was within an ace of it. Even Job, the grandest of them all, needed the Voice out of the whirlwind to put him in his place. But with all that, wisdom is necessary. It is not something to be debated over; it is a datum, however carefully it needs to be chewed before it is swallowed. The Biblical Wisdom is too religious for the mere humanist, too humanistic and natural for the Barthian, too worldly for the religious, too religious for the worldly. Yet we need to hear it and use it, and, if we dare, add to it and develop and apply it.

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Barth's "Doctrine of God," Part II

The latest volume of Barth's *Dogmatik*[1] is divided into two sections. The one deals with the doctrine of election and is entitled "God's Election of Grace," the other with the subject of ethics, and is entitled "God's Commandment." These two themes form a unity in that the former is the ground and presupposition of the latter; and the treatment of both completes the exposition of the doctrine of God. Barth remarks that it is not adequate to treat of God simply in Himself. Since Jesus Christ is both source and goal of all our knowledge of God

[1] *Die Kirkliche Dogmatik*, "Die Lehre von Gott," Band II, 2, Evangelischer Verlag A.-G. Zollikon-Zürich (Fr. 33.50).

He cannot be thought of in abstraction from that relation in which He has freely bound Himself to man. This binding of Himself to man is a "moment" in God's own life-history, and therefore an inalienable element in His very nature. It is fundamental with Barth that God is the living God; that He is a "history"; that His being cannot be abstracted from His living, moving, and working; that He cannot be ranged under a general concept of "being." Since God of His own free grace has decided to enter into fellowship with man, this decision is now unchangeably involved in His being as God. Thus the doctrine of election is a substantial part of the doctrine of God.

Jesus Christ means that the election of God is an election of grace. God chose for *Himself* fellowship with man, and God chose for *man* fellowship with Himself—thus a double predestination. In Jesus Christ, true God and true man, this double predestination becomes event. Jesus Christ is not a mere instrument of the divine election, a mere means whereby God calls out them that are His. He is the one *subject* of election, so that men are called and chosen in and for Him. Barth remarks that the profoundest spirits of the Church have ever occupied themselves with the mysteries of election and predestination. But almost without exception they have let slip their grasp of the truth that the mystery of election is a revealed mystery, that it has become event in Jesus Christ, that it is therefore an election of grace. They have thus made of it something which has outraged man's moral sense. Barth observes acutely that one of the causes of this is that they have dealt with the doctrine too late in their Dogmatic work. It should come at the beginning of Dogmatics proper. God's free decision to enter into fellowship with men is the root and cause of all His ways and works. The doctrine of election is in reality the "sum of the gospel," and not some dark mystery lying behind the gospel and threatening its nature as gospel. The ground of election has unhappily been relegated to the inscrutable will of God, to a *decretum absolutum* (absolute decree) quite apart from that will of grace revealed and realized in Jesus Christ. So Barth departs decisively from Augustine and more decisively still from Calvin. His examination of Calvin's teaching upon the *decretum absolutum* is one of the most valuable critical parts of his work. It is noteworthy that the *decretum absolutum* is here assailed not from the side of rational and ethical considerations which man might of himself throw out, but from the side of revelation, of the divine election itself; and so it is decisively assailed and overthrown. Barth expresses astonishment that neither the great Reformed theologians nor their Arminian opponents ever perceived the root of the error of the *decretum absolutum*. In the case of the former, the reason doubtless was their rightful obsession with the thought of the divine sovereignty. But in dealing with this very theme they stepped off Christian ground, and instead of interpreting the sovereignty as the sovereignty of grace, considered it, to too great an extent, in connexion with the rational idea of omnipotence. In point of fact, just at this critical point they became victims of a natural theology, and as a result left the doctrine of election a dark patch within the sphere of Christian doctrine generally.

Barth then devotes himself to a positive interpretation which in

scope and amplitude, and in profundity of exegetical power, will surely take its place among the great classics of theological thinking. Only the slightest sketch of his exposition is here possible. He begins and ends, here as everywhere, with Jesus Christ, the Christ interpreted by, and Himself the interpretation of, the prophetic witness of the Old Testament and the apostolic witness of the New. Both Old Testament and New speak of God's choice, and ultimately only of that. They know only of a God who chooses. And in both cases this divine choice is directed towards the securing of a community—Israel and the Church—which in the last analysis are identical. This choice of a community is effected and realized in Jesus Christ, the Messiah of Israel and the Lord of the Church. This elect community is not simply one community among many, but the core of all human community. Jesus Christ is therefore the electing God and the elect man become event. There cannot be now God purely in Himself, and man purely in himself. There is only God and man united in that connexion wherein God meets man in free sovereign grace, and man meets God in faith and obedience. In the beginning—not in God's beginning, for God has no beginning; He is Himself pure beginning of all things—God binds Himself to man in the person of His own Eternal Son. The pre-existent God-man is the reality of the divine decree. It is not, of course, as if our humanity existed eternally in God as part of His own being. No, it exists eternally in God as object of God's decision, of His free grace, of the overflowing of that love wherein God is God. God *becomes* man. The Word was made flesh. But this becoming has its root and ground in the eternal decision in which God decrees to bind Himself to man. In that eternal decision He lives His own life as God. Because he is "the loving in freedom," He could choose to live His life thus, and as a matter of fact has so chosen. But to say that God chooses is also to say that He rejects. Here again there is a double predestination. God chooses to be man's God, and He chooses not to be not man's God. The negative decision is just as truly a decision as the positive. Man is not left to himself. He does not fall outside of that choice when he refuses the election of grace, for outside of that choice there is nothing to fall into.

The man to whom God binds Himself is the man in sin and fall. Even as creature, man is *homo labilis*, man liable to fall; in his actual existence, he is *homo lapsus*, man fallen. Therefore as such he lies under the divine rejection. But the election of grace, eternal in the counsels of God and become event on the field of time in Jesus Christ, means that God takes this decree of rejection upon Himself, and bears it in man's stead. In Jesus Christ, God enters into the dark shadow of man's rejection and dissipates it. Christ's Cross signalizes God's absolute condemnation of man; His resurrection, God's acquittal and justification. The former remains in force, but only as the reverse side of the latter. There is, therefore, because of Jesus Christ, no decision of God to reject man, but only the gracious decision to accept him. Does this mean that all will eventually be saved? Barth will not affirm this, but neither will he deny its possibility. The doctrine of election, he remarks, supplies no metaphysic of history. This, however, can be

said, that man must always be addressed as standing within the election of grace. He must ever be claimed for God. There are not two spheres, one of election and the other of reprobation, standing independently over against one another. Even in hell a man will never be able to live his life in independence of the grace of God. His life in hell will be no other than life in refusal of God's choice of grace. Man's natural freedom consists in the fact that he can live this life of refusal. This freedom, election and predestination in no wise annul—indeed, they presuppose it. But man does not stand on some neutral ground from which he can, out of himself, choose to be obedient or disobedient to the divine election. He is taken off all neutral ground, is removed from his isolation over against God and set by God in the crisis of decision. Precisely in that crisis his freedom truly emerges, and that crisis it is which determines whether his response be faith or unfaith, obedience or disobedience.

A further point is this: we are not to think of predestination as something, so to speak, finished and concluded at the beginning of man's history, something that broke off when time began, a mere decree fixing in advance all that should follow after. That would make it a dead thing, a mere first cause or a driving and impelling force. God lives for man in the decision of His grace, and His predestination is His free and continuous working upon men in all the determinations of their lives. The difficulty disappears when we realize that God is Himself a history interpenetrating the history of man. Predestination is salvation history and, as such, the secret of all history. God, says Barth finely, is not the prisoner of His predestination.

It is entirely in order that Barth should pass directly from the problem of predestination to that of ethics. God chooses man in His grace, takes him in claim. The chosen, elected, man is no thing, no neuter, but a person, and thus partner of God in the covenant established by Him. The question that now arises is what does God want of the man thus chosen, and the answer to that question is given in the divine commandment. The great indicative, God's decision of grace, calls for a corresponding decision on the part of man, and thus it becomes an imperative. The content of election is gospel, the form of it is law. The true ethic is a theological ethic. Barth closely distinguishes between a theological ethic based upon election, and a general ethic based upon a philosophical world-view. He refuses to be deterred by the objection that in so doing he is giving an illegitimate meaning to the word "ethic," for the meaning of that word, even in its general application, is not uniform. But, roughly speaking, we may define ethics, in its general sense, as the question about the ground and possibility of certain constancies, certain laws, rules, customs, and continuities which arise in the assemblage of human actions and modes of action. Barth remarks that it is inevitable that general systems of ethic should arise, for in the ethical question, the question of the "ought," man realizes that his very existence is threatened. The ethical question in one form or another is a universal question. Man would not be man at all without it. Therefore the human answers which men have given to the ethical question are full of interest, and

much can be learned from them. But one and all break down before the question how a real and authoritative "ought" can be derived from a mere "will." The "willing" of man cannot yield the "ought." The difference between "will" and "ought" is incommensurable. Barth passes rapidly in review the various types of general ethic which man has thrown up—nature ethic, custom, state law, ethic drawn from philosophies of history, Kant's categorical imperative, value judgments, etc.—and shows how they all collapse at this critical point. He examines with real appreciation the Catholic conception of natural law supplemented by the revealed law of God, and contrasts it favourably with parallel attempts on the part of Liberal Protestantism, dismissing these latter as dilettantism by comparison; but he shows that it cannot stand a critical examination in this regard. The "ought" must come from without, from revelation, and this not in the form of some rule or prescription, but from the living action of the divine will become event in the divine decision. But this does not mean that the divine command is operative only within the sphere of faith, and that those outside this sphere are responsible only to a natural law expressed in some term of general ethic. No, the law of God is universally valid. There is no general ethic. God's election of grace for man makes all men responsible to His law. They all stand, whether they know it or not, whether they will have it so or not, within the sphere of the divine election, and therefore under the imperative of the divine law. Their own determinations are pre-determined by God in His decision of grace, and because of that they are verily responsible. The ground of the law is that men may and can have faith. In opening the way to faith, God has solved for man the problem of ethic, the problem of the "ought," which is also the problem of the "good." Justification by faith alone is the one true ethic for man. Barth then proceeds to apply this standard, showing that the command of God supplies not simply general principles whose working out would have to be left to man's own disposal and competence, but at every point concrete and definite directions which call for obedience.

Considerations of space preclude any real indication of the exegetical foundations on which this great structure of theological thinking is based, and which occupy many pages in the book. It is not without significance that Barth dedicates his work to "The British and Foreign Bible Society in London, as token of gratitude." Not all readers will be at once convinced by the "theological exegesis" thus presented. But further consideration goes a long way towards disqualifying the objections which arise in the mind. Barth is above all "mighty in the scriptures."

A brief comment of a general nature may serve to conclude this review. The further this theological work proceeds, the more evident does it become that in it we have something of immense value for the Church's future. To quote one of Barth's own phrases, it possesses "perspective depth." Spite of the bulk of his Dogmatic writing and the amazing coherence of the thinking, it leads out in a multitude of directions in which further work may be attempted. It is much more

than informative and instructive. It is in the truest sense creative. It is calculated to make its readers theologians themselves. Moreover, the student of this theology comes to realize how impossible it is to classify Barth. He is by ecclesiastical tradition a Reformed Churchman, but like the late Baron von Hügel among Catholics, he makes his ecclesiastical tradition a starting-point rather than a goal. Though often polemical in form, his thinking is essentially eirenical in content and outlook. Anglicans may well find a special appeal in his work from that point of view. The synthesis between ancient Catholic tradition and Reformation confession and purpose, to which Anglicanism seems to be committed, looms very near in Barth's theology.

F. W. Camfield.

Totnes.

A Christian Idea of School Discipline

Now that many Christians are concerned about education as well as Bible lessons, it is time to consider that aspect of all education which is called discipline. The word now has a very wide meaning, covering the whole life of a school, concentrating on the method rather than the content of learning.

I shall start by reviewing the present situation. We are still in a phase of reaction from authoritarian repression, the heyday of Victorian flogging headmasters who were mostly clergymen. Kindliness is now the fashion. "Times have changed since I was a boy; they no longer hate school." Such is the general and complacent commentary, but a more serious view will show four different main attitudes towards discipline. There is the extreme left, people who have exploited the reaction from repression to the point of anarchy; who allow children not to wash, to break the school's property and to swear at its staff. Secondly, there is the extreme right wing of reaction, people who have dug their ditches and counter-reform in all directions. Particular examples might cause me libel suits. Thirdly, there is that big majority which keeps up a faint appearance of not being behind the times, but has not strength enough to grasp the future. They are Acton's "repentant monarchy" before the French Revolution; free in patches while the garment remains essentially old and constricting. And, lastly, there is the type, approved by most in theory, who follow a happy medium of ordered freedom, like Erasmus welcoming his renaissance without discarding the medieval heritage, welcoming the new enlightenment minus all its excesses and cranks. Why is progress towards this last type so slow? I suggest two main answers, economic and ideological. Most day and many boarding schools have not the money to provide enough staff, space and other equipment to enable ordered freedom. And in many schools where money exists, the effective idea of freedom does not. They are restricted by the dead hand of traditional authority, with its caps and gowns and lordly prefects.

I am convinced that here is terrain for a Christian crusade, that the Churches should now make war against bad schools as fiercely as they

did against secular schools in the past. But crusading action is likely to be dangerous in the long run unless it is joined to positive thought. We need, therefore, to begin constructing a richer and more thorough Christian idea of discipline. What follows is my first attempt at the job.

As discipline is now such a wide term it is necessary to begin with a definition of education. I would define it, then, as the training of the individual through the school community towards the fullest understanding of life and the fullest practice of good life in the world. From this emerges the first and most important of three pairs of disciplinary principles, each pair being a dynamic unity of opposites.

1. *Individual and Society.*—The individual child is himself and no one else. He has the right to continue being himself through all stages of development. The old horticultural analogy still holds. It is not good for either children or plants to be set so close together that roots and branches cramp each other. On the other hand, no child can grow without society, and to grow well he needs to accept society in a positive way. He needs to be taught a social and co-operative concern wherever possible. This double need for the self and others is a main cause of tension and trouble in schools. But few schools at present seem to recognize the tension, and so they make it more troublesome than it need be. Chiefly owing to the obstacle of large classes, the two principles are separated and perverted. Instead of good individuality there is bad individualism, because the easiest way to keep superficial discipline is to infect and feed an endemic fever of marks. The main curriculum is served up with form orders and examinations, encouraging each child to be for himself, and in fact to gloat over the weaknesses of his more stupid neighbours. The same individualism is encouraged by school games, for even the team-spirit is largely a pooled self-esteem.

The social principle is similarly perverted. Instead of a naturally human and social concern there is the sub-human gregarious behaviour of children *en masse*, encouraged by the mass methods of those who have to drive the herd. The class must be kept in order, and the individual with his special case is a nuisance who must be reminded that he is merely one out of thirty. And in their spare time children are so left together without positive occupation that even without the official drover they still behave like a herd. So is developed that stunting fear of doing what is not done according to an arbitrary and puerile public opinion.

We (I presume to speak for my profession) neither allow a child to be himself by himself, nor do we allow him to meet his fellows when they are themselves. Yet in this double encounter with ourselves and others lies the very stuff of discipline and personal development:

> That with the world, myself and Thee,
> I ere I sleep at peace may be.

Such peace is a lifelong objective and the work should be well started at school. "And Thee"—here is where Christianity can push the bright ideas of modern education to its old conclusion. Troeltsch writes of Christian social ethic that "its first outstanding characteristic is an

unlimited, unqualified individualism." And later: "In the last resort the idea of fellowship springs from the fact that those who are being purified for the sake of God meet in Him."[1] In other words, the business of loving God will insure that the individual remains himself, a unique son of God. He will be safeguarded from all bogus secular attempts at society, which resemble the herd whether in its trampling or fawning facets. On the other hand, there has never been a more thorough social sense than in the Christian *koinonia*.

2. *Order and Freedom.*—This second pair of opposite principles follows close on the first, for while the individual demands freedom, society except for the anarchist must have order. Now Christianity has nearly always accepted both the "good gifts of order and freedom," and it has itself been at once the most conservative and the most revolutionary force of the last two thousand years.

The Christian disciplinarian stands for the free individual, as already argued, but he should also stand for an order which will mould and sometimes restrain that freedom. He disagrees with the anarchist type of school based on a perfectionist philosophy. His belief in original sin would rather define schools as hospitals for children in a permanently sick world. Two kinds of order can be distinguished, intellectual and social. There is hardly space to deal with the first, but it can be stated simply that order demands a common curriculum of generally useful techniques and a few corpora of knowledge before anyone is allowed much freedom in choosing his own special subjects. We must all live in the same world, and to a great extent need to know and do the same things in it. Next, social order entails a code of rules and sanctions to maintain the rules. But in the Christian idea the order should be as internal as possible, based on individual and social responsibility, and using the external code to a minimum. In this matter Christian educationists should make a positive response to the Russian challenge. "It is generally accepted that educational experiments in methods and discipline were carried out on a vaster scale in the Soviet Union than anywhere else in the world, and that children were given freedom and responsibility on an equally vast scale."[2] There is no doubt that school order can to a great extent be effectively socialized. Discipline, like everything else, begins to please children when it becomes their own show, not that of the headmaster or his staff or his juvenile satraps. Certainly children want safeguarding from precocious police work, but this is already the fault of the prefect system. School authority should be shared out to groups of children in suitable measure, while the staff reserves certain departments of law and a power of veto. At present it is usually a monopolizing leviathan; it should move in the direction of *communitas communitatum*.

I suggest that the code of punishment should be as fixed and impersonal as possible in order not to discredit Christian morals by heavy moralizing and pedagogic neurosis. It should exclude two

[1] Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1931), I, 55*f*.
[2] Beatrice King, *Discipline in Soviet Schools*, Times Educational Supplement, December 13, 1941.

commonly-used types of force: first sarcasm, that superior mental force which is more devastating than any stick; and secondly the stick itself. The whole controversy of corporal punishment cannot now be reviewed, but I suggest that no Christian idea should include a method which is at worst so cruel and at best so crude. The restriction of liberty is enough sanction, and with enforced occupation it can be made fully reasonable. It is perhaps hardly necessary to add that a large number, now considered subjects for punishment, should be transferred to the sphere of psychiatric treatment. A large number, but not the whole, for religion believes in wrong behaviour as well as diseased.

At present the two great complementary principles of order and freedom are commonly separated and perverted into repression and licence. They should be regarded by Christians as the two good gifts, charging each other for the common objective of the good life which is in fact an ordered freedom.

3. *Activity and Rest.*—A successful discipline of personal life largely depends on a good alternation between work and play, and between different modes of work and play, the more and the less active. Plato emphasized the need to combine musical and gymnastic training, and to-day we should be able to extend his efforts to harmonize the two mental hemispheres of conscious and subconscious. The inactive leisure intervals are not inactive for the subconscious mind, and if misspent our conscious life will suffer in due time.

In Christian thought this contrast is closely parallel with the distinction between faith and works, between sharing in the Church Militant and meditating on the Church Triumphant. It has been suggested that the "renewed interest in the Middle Ages meant among other things a realization of the place of fruition, of enjoyment, of the beatific vision, as the aim and heart of true religion."[1] Many Christians have realized the weakness of a merely busy religion. They should turn the same insight on to schools, where the old emphasis on games and hard work and the new emphasis on active individual as against passive class methods both tend to discount the sphere of rest. I think they would then be more keen to support an increase of education in the arts, their practice and specially their appreciation. While much good work has been done, the arts are usually granted a footing and not their due place. I believe that Christians will come to see that the cause of the arts in school links closely with the cause of Christian worship. For both are stifled in the present atmosphere of over-busy intellectualism.

At the same time the principle of activity is observed with more appearance than reality, and the vast potential energy of the young mind is allowed to run down in criminal wastage. Academic methods of teaching are mostly at fault. All subjects taught by active heuristic method will interest and ultimately discipline the mind, and conversely a passive participation in "chalk and talk" pedagogy will leave the mind uninterested and uncontrolled.

[1] H. G. Wood, *Christianity and the Nature of History* (1934), p. 212.

So much for the three pairs of principles forming my main idea of Christian discipline, but the idea need not exclude the question of who can work it. Even the most academic army manual demands qualified personnel to carry out its operations. Does the idea of Christian discipline demand Christian qualifications for all its personnel? I believe not, and, shifting to a political phrase, I would urge for a united front between the Christian and the secular educationist. This article, if mainly true, has proved that they share a large common ground.

But the professing Christian needs to be there in no less proportion than the salt and the leaven. And if his leadership is to inspire, he himself must be inspired by the dynamic of prayer and worship. For here is the only power guaranteed not to run down, the infinite and vital interchange of time with eternity.

Among the strains and perplexing tension of human affairs the Christian disciplinarian may always get new light from Him, the authentic paradox of whose service is perfect freedom.

E. W. Edmonds.

Jordans.

CORRESPONDENCE

CALVIN AND TRADITION

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

May I have a little of your much-restricted space to reply to a criticism made by Mr E. R. Lewis on p. 222 of your November issue? He speaks of my "clear errors of fact" which he "has been at pains to verify," with the following results: in the Institutes Calvin uses Augustine 230, Chrysostom 27, and Gregory 39 times; "the statement that Bernard is quoted most often next to Augustine in the Institutes is not true. Bernard is quoted 21 times, and at least once there is duplication."

Mr Lewis does not state what edition he is using, but his footnote suggests that he is content to rely on a two-volume English translation by Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh 1863). The *Calvini Opera* used and cited by me is the standard Strasburg edition of Baum, Cunitz and Reuss (*C.R.*, vols. 29-87); the statements on p. 148 of my *Christian Doctrine* rest on a study of the still unfinished and unindexed *Calvini Opera Selecta* by Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel (1925-), an edition of great learning which does much to establish the point at issue.

The results to which I came after going through the Latin text of the definitive edition of the *Institutio* in Barth and Niesel are as follows. The number of explicit references to St Augustine's works, so far from being as few as 230, is certainly over rather than under 500. St Bernard is cited 56 times (probably 57). Chrysostom is cited 49 times, but 8 of these references being disallowed by the Maurists ("praetermissa a Maurinis." say the editors), I did not include them in my estimate;

nor did I count 10 similar references to works which exact scholarship knows as Pseudo-Chrysostom. Gregory I is cited at least 85 times, but 71 of these references are to his Letters, which Calvin very properly uses as an original source for his account of the Church and the Papacy in the early centuries. Indeed, the main concern of these references is with history rather than with theology, with historical events illustrating the evolution of ecclesiastical institutions rather than with Churchmanship in its dogmatic aspect (which is the peculiar concern of my note on the Reformation and Churchmanship). The references to Gregory's works which, in my judgment, have affinity with those to Augustine, Bernard and Chrysostom in the *Institutio*, are 14 in number.

Perhaps the special value of this latest edition of Calvin is its monumental research into his sources—ancient, medieval and contemporary—which, in this respect, enables it to take precedence of the noble achievement of Baum, Cunitz and Reuss (1863-1900). In fact, the *Institutio* is now seen with increasing clearness to be a detailed and systematic commentary on what Calvin himself collates as "non solum scriptura sed etiam veteris Ecclesiae consensus" (IV. xvii. 14).

Moreover, this research is still going on. In their "Loci scriptorum a Calvino allati unde deprompti sint indicatur" (*Calvini Opera* III. pp. lvii-lviii) the editors conclude: "Ut autem quæ cognatio Calvino sit aliis scriptoribus, velut cum Augustino, Bernardo Claravallensi, Thoma Aquinate, Luthero, Melanchthone, Bucero, Zwinglio, Erasmo, plane illustretur, lucubrationibus opus est diuturnis, intentis, copiosis."

One implication, at least, of these words seems clear. As for my note on the Reformation and Churchmanship, I am content that it should be judged in the light of *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Calvinforschung*, 1909-1934 (to quote the title of Barth's article in the *Theologische Rundschau*, 1934).

Yours faithfully,
J. S. WHALE.

CHESHUNT COLLEGE LODGE,
CAMBRIDGE,
November 4, 1942.

The Rev. E. Ridley Lewis writes:

"I have to admit that my figures in the recent article, 'Calvin and Tradition,' were based on Beveridge. They were strictly figures of quotations and not citations. There is no other explanation of the serious disparities between Dr Whale's figures and those I gave—*e.g.*, 500 as against 230 for Augustine, 85 as against 39 for Gregory, 57 as against 22 for Bernard. On this question I willingly yield to Dr Whale. Will not someone do for English readers of Calvin what has been done recently for him in Hungary, France, Holland and Germany? Beveridge is now eighty years old! Perhaps Dr Whale is our man for the task.

"On the main issues of my article, however, I cannot yield. I must content myself with making these points only:

"1. The disproportions in the use of the Fathers cited remains and is substantiated by Dr Whale's new figures. Beveridge is a faithful guide here.

"2. The point I made as to the content and intent of the citations

remains unaffected. We still do not find the Bernard we know and love in the pages of Calvin.

"3. The judgment of Dr Warfield, supported by the host of scholars he names, and including Hodge and Kuyper, as to the true Formative Principle of Calvinism is unaffected by the new facts.

"4. I regard the quotation from the *Institutes*, Book IV, xvii, 14, as a statement of fact on Calvin's part, and not an indication of a principle on which he works. I should like to give it in full in English. Calvin is attacking transubstantiation, which says he 'reduces substance to nothing' (*cf.* Art. XXVIII of B.C.P.); he goes on: 'It is strange that they have fallen into such a degree of ignorance—nay, of stupor—as to produce this monstrous fiction not only against Scripture, but also against the consent of the ancient Church.' "

BOOK REVIEWS

A Detection of Aumbries. With other Notes on the History of Reservation. By Dom Gregory Dix, Monk of Nashdom Abbey. Dacre Press. 3s. 6d.

These "Notes" on Reservation were originally written as an Appendix to a forthcoming book. Requests from the clergy of certain dioceses for historical information, however, prompted the author to publish his Appendix as a separate work. Every student will rejoice that he has done so. Modest in format though it be, this little book is very much more than a collection of notes. Indeed, it would be accurately described as "A Brief and Necessary Introduction" to its subject. For while the larger works of W. H. Freestone and J. Braun are admittedly forests of information, yet it is not always easy, especially for the tiro, to open or discover paths through the forest; and here, with a learning and lucidity reminiscent of the notes and comments of a Mabillon or of a Martène, Dom Gregory Dix marks out the main paths, and indicates the by-paths and side-tracks as well.

No discussion of Reservation, however dispassionate and objective, can escape being read with controversial implications in Anglican circles at the present time. Dom Gregory Dix recognizes this fact at the outset; and, disclaiming all intention to argue for any particular practice or lack of practice, is careful to describe his aim as the setting out of "a mere statement of historical evidence which seems to be relevant to some of the discussions now proceeding among us, and yet to be very generally ignored." Historians will agree that he has achieved his aim with marked success. Controversialists, on the other hand, will not improbably be scandalized, so many correctives does the author administer to favourite controversial assumptions of one kind or another. Those who have supposed, for instance, that in the ancient Church Reservation was of rare occurrence, practised only in special emergencies of sickness and death, will learn that it was a general usage, and by the third century had become the normal

means of providing the majority of Christians, whole as well as sick, clergy as well as laity, with daily Communion. Those, again, who claim for the parish priest an inalienable right to reserve perpetually in the parish church, and those who, in opposition, invest the ordinaries with an inalienable right to regulate or forbid Reservation, as they see fit, will learn how strong is the case for regarding the individual layman as possessed of an inalienable right to reserve privately, either in his house or about his person; they will learn, also, how comparatively late is the appearance of regulation in the matter of Reservation. Those, further, who are persuaded that, on account of its practice of reserving only the species of Bread, the ancient Church must be condemned for abandoning New Testament principles of thought and procedure will be reminded that guiltiness of the Lord's body and blood, of which we read in 1 Corinthians xi, 27, is incurred by such as eat the bread *or* drink the cup unworthily. "St Paul," to quote Dom Gregory Dix's summary of the matter, "does in fact . . . indicate that the full Sacrament may be profaned under either kind separately, and is therefore received in full under either kind."

The main body of the book, however, is concerned with the place of Reservation. Here again the author is likely to disillusion and to astonish. The evidence which he sets before them might well surprise the partisans of the aumbry on one side and of the tabernacle on the other out of the asperity, and even contempt, which they sometimes exhibit towards each other. For the tabernacle is not a Roman or Italian, but a French development; and the aumbry, whether in the church or in the vestry, is the place of Reservation most in accord with the directions of the Lateran Council of 1215, which, having formulated its statement of transubstantiation, proceeded to devise measures for the safeguarding both of the Eucharist and the Chrism from any "horrid or evil" use. The "sacrament-houses," still found at the entrance of the choir in churches of the Low Countries, represent an attempt to obey the Lateran direction, while rendering the Sacrament accessible to that cultus of the faithful which northern Catholicism, unlike southern, had developed. The practice of suspension, favoured by some Anglicans on the ground that loyalty to the national character of the English Reformation requires the reformed Church of England to revive the local practices of the unreformed *Ecclesia Anglicana*, is the one method unquestionably condemned by the English Reformers, because of its associations with cultus. So Cranmer ruled; and after him, it may be added, the Elizabethan Bishop Jewel, who was willing to concede the reasonableness of Reservation, if necessity should ever justify it for communion, found the danger of Reservation to consist in a method and place which invited the worship of the faithful. Considering the custom of the East, Dom Gregory Dix argues that, if Reservation be permitted, the Communion table is the place upon which East and West are agreed; and considerations of safety (by no means irrelevant at the present time) would seem to lead him to favour the tabernacle, constructed in accordance with Roman regulation in the tradition of the Lateran direction, as providing the maximum protection.

An academic historian may be disposed to enquire how, having regard to Reformation doctrine and regulation, an Anglican could contemplate Reservation under any conditions, and in any place, which expose the Sacrament to cultus. It is not within Dom Gregory Dix's purpose to discuss controversial issues. At the same time he does not ignore the pertinence of the question. He admits that Cranmer had intended to exclude cultus of the Sacrament once and for all. Only the perverse could dissent from this view; for, apart from Cranmer's statement of Eucharistic doctrine in his treatise on the Sacrament, the Communion Service of 1552 avoided any suggestion of "consecration" (as Bishop Scot of Chester pointed out), and contained no formula relating the elements to the Lord's Body and Blood, thus depriving Reservation, with or without cultus, of *raison d'être*. There could be no question of Reservation in the Church of England to-day, then, unless, so Dom Gregory Dix holds, the Communion Service of 1559 had added the Administration Formulæ of 1549 to those of 1552. In making this addition, he says, "the Elizabethan Prayer Book did, apparently intentionally, reopen doors which Cranmer had intended to shut fast." In the opinion of the present reviewer, "apparently *un*-intentionally" would be nearer to the truth than "apparently intentionally"; yet the amendment would not affect Dom Gregory Dix's case. The judgment upon Robert Johnson in 1571 and the XXIst canon of 1603 show that, half a century after Cranmer's death, official Anglican thought upon the Sacrament was no longer strictly confined within Cranmerian limits. For the Sacrament to be "perfected," it was necessary, not only that the faithful should receive bread and wine in thankful remembrance of Christ's death in obedience to Christ's command, of which they had been reminded by the prayer known to us since 1662 as "the Prayer of Consecration," but also that "the words of institution" should be rehearsed over *all* the bread and *all* the wine before their distribution to the people. As long as a reformed interpretation of the Eucharist was generally current, it was impossible for the Administration Formulæ, or for the practice of "additional consecration," to suggest essentially unreformed ideas; but it was inevitable that, as soon as the Anglican appeal to antiquity had ceased to be controlled by reformed presuppositions, the Elizabethan additions should suggest ideas and beliefs, and eventually practices, fundamentally incompatible with the standard of 1552. The only adequate safeguard against such developments lies in an open repudiation of antiquity (a course which Cranmer dared not pursue, although he clearly knew how contrary to the tradition of antiquity his Eucharistic doctrine was), and in a return to the Communion Service of 1552.

This brief review has inevitably concentrated only upon a few points and cannot pretend to do justice to Dom Gregory Dix's book. It can merely be said, in conclusion, that here we have a commentary of first value upon an important chapter in the history of Christian worship. As a *Vale* to this "Appendix," the reviewer may be permitted, perhaps, to express the hope that Dom Gregory Dix will enable us, at the earliest possible date, to acclaim with *Ave* his forthcoming work.

Oxford. E. C. Ratcliff.

THE MINISTRY AND THE EUCHARIST. By W. J. Sparrow-Simpson. S.P.C.K. 6s.

The growing realization among Christian people of the godlessness of the society in which we are living has given a fresh impetus to the Reunion Movement. There is a danger, however, that vital truths will be conceded in the effort to present a united Christian front to the world, and Dr Sparrow-Simpson has done the cause of Reunion a real service by dealing in a clear and comprehensive way with the burning question: May a layman celebrate the Eucharist in exceptional circumstances, or may he not? He discusses the subject in three parts. First, he shows that in "the Church of the centuries" a priest was always required for a valid celebration of the Eucharist. When the conditions required for the Sacraments could not be fulfilled, the Church resorted to spiritual Communion. Having considered, secondly, the theory and practice of the Church of England since the Reformation, he proceeds, in his third section, to an examination of some recent movements towards Reunion. The South India Reunion scheme, he thinks, will produce in the long run an external uniformity rather than true spiritual unity, since "two types of episcopal communion seem likely to co-exist, one relying officially only on the form, the other insisting on its doctrinal meaning" (p. 190). The Lambeth Conference (1930), termed "a fragment of the Episcopate," "has no authority to commission a layman to consecrate the Eucharist" (p. 210). But if the local Episcopate is bound not to depart in doctrine and practice in any way from the "main tradition" of the Universal Church, then the Anglican Episcopate should still believe and teach the pre-Copernican system and keep the Sabbath as well as Sunday. And is it not inconsistent to maintain rigidly that the episcopal transmission of ministry is of Divine intention and yet to allow that "Christ has utilized and blessed them all" (p. 192)? The question is posed: "Does that mean that He approves them all?" The only answer suggested is that the non-episcopal ministries merely served "a valuable purpose for a while" under "the conditions of the sixteenth century, in which certain of these conceptions of the ministry arose." But it is quite obvious that those "exceptional local conditions" have long since passed away and that Christ *still* utilizes and blesses them all.

The root of Canon Simpson's problem is the nature of the activity of the Holy Spirit. Granted that a "Divinely commissioned ministerial constitution" arose under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, does it follow that no change in that constitution can occur without the loss of the "Divine commission"? We are told that "the tradition of the Western Church [with regard to the celebration of the Eucharist by a priest only] was formulated in the fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215" (p. 49). So was the medieval doctrine of transubstantiation.

The Commission on Doctrine appointed by the Archbishops in 1922 acknowledged, as Canon Simpson notes, the historical fact that the main tradition of the Church has condemned the celebration of the Eucharist by anyone except a priest, although some of them were able to affirm that the Eucharist cannot in any circumstances be celebrated by a lay person acting with due intention. The same

Commission asserted (and Canon Simpson does not note this): "We believe that there has come a change in our outlook which must be fully acknowledged. We no longer regard precedents, as such, as decisive for all time" (*Report*, p. 117). A footnote to this remark quoted the distinction drawn by Richard Hooker, the classical defender of Anglican polity, between "points of doctrine" and "matters of regiment." Perhaps the cause of Reunion will best be served by holding fast to the former without being too rigid in regard to the latter. We would agree wholeheartedly with Canon Simpson's conclusion that laymen in the mission field who are qualified by character and experience for the functions hitherto assigned exclusively to a priest should be ordained rather than permitted to officiate at the Eucharist as laymen for lack of sufficient priests. But that does not touch the bigger problem of Reunion with the non-episcopal Churches at home.

The book should stimulate thought on a subject of vital importance at the present time. The more it is thought out, and prayed out, the sooner will come that Reunion which we all desire.

TIXALL. C. W. DUGMORE.

A PREFACE TO PARADISE LOST. By C. S. Lewis. O.U.P. 7s. 6d.

Those who have learned to expect from Mr Lewis a combination of Christian sense with a brilliant and witty style will not be disappointed with this book. It is relevant to its subject and at the same time refreshingly original. Its aim is "to 'hinder hindrances' to the appreciation of *Paradise Lost*." It does not ask what kind of a man Milton was, or what he might have done if he had written a play instead of an heroic poem, or in rhymed verses instead of blank verse. Instead it takes the simple but really rather novel approach of trying to understand what Milton actually aimed at doing. Mr Lewis therefore discusses such things as the nature of epic, the style of *Paradise Lost*, the character of Satan, the meaning of "degrees" and hierarchy in the civil and the cosmic settings, the relation of the story to Christian tradition, and similar objective and definable matters.

What are some of the common assumptions about *Paradise Lost*? Written by an Arian heretic, in a remote and difficult latinized and semi-archaic style, the poem, which proposes to "justify the ways of God to men," is supposed at worst to present the reader with an account of Milton's own prejudices, and at best to have distorted the avowed purpose by the portrayal of Satan as a character of tragic dimensions. Or, again, with a more precisely theological critique, it is held that Milton himself was responsible for the main outline of the story in such a way that the poem is merely a succession of abstract arguments about highly controversial themes. Thus it has been said that you find in *Paradise Lost* the typical expression of seventeenth century individualism and Puritanism, according to which the only furniture in heaven or hell is the bare intellectualisms of the rebellious soul. In spite of Mr Lewis, it is obvious that there is more point in the further criticism which sees, in distinction from what Professo

Saurat calls the "theological rubbish," a store of rich and exciting poetry. Remember, for instance, the description of Adam himself, and of the Garden of Eden, and many other passages where the exuberant resources of the Renaissance splendour are at this "Puritan" poet's disposal.

But Mr Lewis is well aware of this mass of criticism, and point by point he reduces the attackers till *Paradise Lost* is left in its proper splendour. For instance, to the argument about the theology he answers that the theme is indeed theological, for it is about how paradise was lost, and is:

> . . . as far as doctrine goes overwhelmingly Christian. . . . It gives the great central tradition . . . dogmatically its invitation to join in this great ritual *mimesis* of the Fall is one which all Christendom in all lands or ages can accept.

To the further point that *Paradise Lost* is not a religious poem, Mr Lewis remarks:

> . . . the cosmic story . . . is set before us. We are invited for the time being to look at it from outside. And that is not, in itself, a religious exercise. When we remember that we also have our places in this plot . . . then we are entering the world of religion. But when we do that, our epic holiday is over; we rightly shut up our Milton.

Every other point discussed—*e.g.*, the history of the meaning of *solemn* or of *pompous*, the significance of Virgil's achievement, the place of platonic theology in seventeenth-century England—helps to throw into relief Milton's real success in a kind known before him in English only by its half-finished failures.

It is well done, it is disarmingly simple and modest in its pretensions ("I am not enough of a scholar to say," says Mr Lewis more than once), and at the same time it ranges across the whole story of epic poetry.

Ronald Gregor Smith.

Selkirk.

Science and the Spiritual: The Threshold of Theology. By T. E. Jessop. Sheldon Press. 1s. 6d.

This new Christian News-Letter Book is well printed and pleasantly produced, and is very good value for its price. Professor Jessop's main theme is to show that the place of ideals in human life is fundamental and not merely a by-product of science existing on sufferance. The lecture form in which the material was originally given is retained; and while this makes the book very readable it does at times lead to a scrappy treatment of important points. The author had a difficult task in dealing with a very urgent problem of thought and has produced something which will help many people who find the unaccustomed abstraction of most philosophical writing very difficult to master. The old "religion and science" controversy has now come into prominence again in the guise of "science and ethics," and the universities and upper science forms at schools are seething with it. Nor is it really a controversy at all; it is rather that the theologians have failed to speak in terms intelligible to educated young men and women who have

consequently sought for counsel elsewhere, and that from science itself an attempt is being made to justify the existence of ethical standards. This tendency is one with which we have to reckon very seriously indeed, and no amount of disdain or detachment will provide the answer to it. Professor Jessop's book is one of the very few suitable books available at the moment to deal with this situation. It is full of ideas which, as the author admits, cry out for a larger treatment than is possible here. The reader will sometimes be puzzled to know what is really meant. A particular case is the handling of causality. While it is fairly clear what the author means on p. 56 when he says that freedom is "freedom from causal necessity," it is by no means clear what he means by causality. The reader is left in ignorance of the classical distinction between efficient and final causation which would seem to be the point which the author is really trying to make. Again, on p. 18, the discussion of the relation between ideas of the perfect and the imperfect seems to ignore the distinction between the *Ordo cognoscendi* and the *Ordo essendi*, and does not help much in the development of the main theme of the book. These are, however, comparatively small points in a book of this kind; and many who are often asked to recommend "a book" will be grateful to Professor Jessop for this one.

C. D. Waddams.

Cambridge.

Letters of Herbert Cardinal Vaughan to Lady Herbert of Lea, 1867 to 1903. Edited by Shane Leslie, with an introduction by J. Brodrick, S.J. Burns Oates. 18s.

Lady Herbert was the widow of Sidney Herbert, Gladstone's great friend. Her husband died in 1861, and she was left with seven children. Soon afterwards she entered the Church of Rome, and wanted the children to accompany her, but this was prevented by their guardians. Later, only one of them became a Roman Catholic (Lady Mary), who married Baron Friedrich von Hügel. Lady Herbert's intimate friendship with Herbert Vaughan began in 1866, and continued until the latter's death. He acted as her spiritual director, and she generously assisted him in his various good works. Their correspondence was frequent, and in the early years extensive. Vaughan appears to have destroyed all the letters he received from Lady Herbert, but she carefully kept his to her, and here we have them in 450 pages of close print.

No use was made of the letters in Snead-Cox's *Life of Cardinal Vaughan*, because Lady Herbert, who lived until 1911, did not approve of the biographer and would not allow him to see them. We are not convinced that they were worth publishing now. The letters chiefly consist (*a*) of Vaughan's spiritual directions to Lady Herbert, which are edifying, but repetitious; (*b*) of information about the good works in which they were both interested; and (*c*) of reports on what the writer was doing from day to day. The reflections on public affairs are insignificant, and the writer's lack of any profound interest in the intellectual and social problems of the period is evident. Nevertheless, he was in his way a great ecclesiastic, though of smaller stature than

either of his predecessors in the Archbishopric of Westminster, and he was a man of abounding energy and devotion. These letters show that he also possessed a warmth of human sympathy which was concealed from the public.

Mr Shane Leslie, as editor, has inserted a few annotations. These are not always accurate. On p. 292, with reference to an allusion to Gladstone's visit to Ireland in 1877, he remarks: "This is interesting, as it is generally stated that Mr Gladstone never visited Ireland." But this visit is well known, and was duly recorded by Morley. It is also incorrect to say that Cowper and Forster were "Irish Viceroy and Chief Secretary at the time" of the Phœnix Park murders (p. 347).

HAWARDEN. A. R. VIDLER.

THE FEAR OF FREEDOM. By Erich Fromm. Kegan, Paul. 15s.

This is the first volume to be published in "The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction." If the succeeding volumes are up to the standard of this, the series will be of great value. Few people realize how retrograde this country is in sociological studies, and it is well that Professor Karl Mannheim, the editor of the series, will be able to draw on the services of scholars from the Continent and from America. Christians cannot afford to ignore the new psychological and sociological insights for which we have to thank many non-Christian investigators. Professor Dalbiez has shown in his book on Freud how important it is not to depreciate new empirical discoveries because they have been mixed up with false or childish metaphysics by those who made them.

The merit of Dr Fromm's book is that it shows that "freedom" is not so simple and obviously desirable a thing as democratic propaganda suggests. In the Middle Ages "personal, economic, and social life was dominated by rules and obligations from which practically no sphere of activity was exempted." Although there was thus in one sense a lack of individual freedom, by comparison with modern man the individual was secure and content; he accepted his place within a hierarchical social order, and within those limits was free to express himself in his work and in other ways. But there was hardly any freedom in the modern sense of the unrestricted choice between many possible ways of life. The post-rennaissance period has been characterized by the emergence of the individual (*e.g.*, contrast the ambition of modern man for individual fame with the absence of such a concern in medieval man) and the "progressive" removal of external restrictions on his freedom.

The result was the release of tremendous energies, and for a long time the exhilaration was intoxicating. But we are now discovering that freedom is an ambiguous gift. Dr Fromm's thesis is that modern man, while in being freed from traditional authorities he has become an "individual," has at the same time become isolated, lonely, insecure, rootless; when he becomes aware of this he is frightened, and is ready for submission to new kinds of bondage. Freedom becomes a burden too heavy for man to bear, something he tries to escape from.

This thesis may not be fresh, but it is worked out in a most illuminating way. The conclusion is that the totalitarian régimes are mechanisms of escape from freedom. If our only alternative is one that equates freedom with the absence of external pressures and disregards the need for the presence of a new and positive principle of integration, it will prove to be no alternative. Dr Fromm sees that the democracies have not yet realized this need, and his suggestions as to how it is to be met are not very promising. What we have to thank him for is an original analysis of our problem in terms of social psychology, and an incentive to look even deeper than he does himself for the answer.

The book deserves to be widely read and discussed.

HAWARDEN. A. R. VIDLER.

EIN GANG DURCH DEN GALATERBRIEF. By K. L. Schmidt. Evangelischer Verlag Zollikon-Zürich. Fr. 5.

Karl Ludwig Schmidt is best known in England as a pioneer in Form Criticism. But that was before the theological revival. Since then he has come under the influence of Kittel and the Wörterbuch, to which he has himself contributed. In this latest work he defines his purpose thus: "To follow a course through someone else's work means first to let yourself be led by the author, and then to lead your readers yourself." In short, his purpose is to give a theological exposition of Galatians. Therefore there is no "critical" discussion, historical or textual, save in so far as this is helpful in elucidating the Apostle's meaning. It is a relief to hear nothing of the North or South Galatian theory, but most instructive to see how a variant reading, in itself inferior, can yet throw significant light on the meaning of the original. Schmidt presses into the same service the versions—especially the Vulgate, Luther's Bible, and the Zürich version. The Church's traditional liturgical selections can also be helpful—*e.g.*, the choice of Luke xvii, 11-19 for the Gospel on the Fourteenth Sunday after Trinity throws light on the Epistle (Gal. v, 16-24). Anglicans will appreciate the growing awakening in Continental Protestantism to the theological importance of the Liturgy. On the other hand, they will miss the use of the Fathers, such as is made by Sir Edwin Hoskyns in the *Fourth Gospel*.

Schmidt attempts to comprehend the Epistle as a unity, not formal, but theological—that is, centred upon Jesus Christ. As He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, so Galatians is susceptible of a three-fold division: (I) i, 1-iii, 5: Christ as the Life, manifested in the experience of the Apostle and his converts. (Experience, not "religious," but specifically Christian experience, set in motion and controlled by the saving activity of God in Christ, is again receiving proper recognition; existential philosophy was a necessary purge at the time, but unsuitable as a permanent diet.) (II) iii, 6-iv, 31: Christ is the Truth revealed in the Old Testament Scripture. (III) v, 1-end: Christ as the Way, manifested in Christian behaviour. Experience, doctrine, and behaviour are all one—in Christ. To divide them is the mark of un-

redeemed man. So too with faith and works (*Glaube und Gehorsam und Wechselbegriffe*, p. 36).

After a salutary period of purgation, continental Biblical scholarship is emerging less doctrinaire, less "existential," more positive in its evaluation of Christian experience. In some quarters concern has been voiced that the Biblical revival in this country was tending to express itself in the idiom of Continental Lutheranism and Calvinism rather than in that of traditional Anglicanism. The spirit of this work demonstrates that a thorough-going Biblicism is (as it should be) fully consistent with Anglican tradition.

REGINALD H. FULLER.

BAKEWELL.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE END OF SACRIFICE. By E. O. Humphrey Whitby. S.P.C.K. 2s.

The vicar of St Mary the Virgin, Pimlico, has here made a brave attempt to show that the Eucharistic rite of 1552 involved no change of doctrine, at least with regard to the "sacrificial aspect" of the service, and that it simply explained and perfected the order of 1549, as the Act of Uniformity (1552) asserts. But care was taken in the proclamation authorizing and enforcing the amended (1559) book in 1604 to call the alterations by the name of "explanations" rather than "changes," and the canons of 1640 were issued under the same powers as those invoked by James. Yet no one would suggest that all these "explanations" involved no change of doctrine whatever. Darwell Stone (*History of the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, vol. ii, 136-42) and C. H. Smyth (*Cranmer and the Reformation, passim*), writing from quite different standpoints, both suggest that the 1552 rite can only properly be understood when the whole character of the Prayer Book to which it was affixed and the historical background of this most difficult period are taken into account.

THE BIBLE AND THE MINISTRY. By M. R. Newbolt. Dacre Press. 3s.

The last half-century has seen a revolution in Biblical scholarship. The old fundamentalism has well-nigh disappeared. There have been very great and positive gains in the modern approach to the Bible, as Canon Newbolt admits, but the concentration on the comparative study of religions, textual criticism, and the rest, in our universities and theological colleges, has produced a generation of clergy well versed in what the latest scholarship has to say about the Bible rather than in what is written in the Bible itself. The liturgical services of the Church will only again fulfil the rôle they were intended to fulfil when the clergy teach their people to regard the Bible as the Word of God. All this, and much more, is set out in this witty, scholarly, and stimulating little booklet, which deserves to be widely read.

C. W. DUGMORE.

TIXALL.

NOTES

THE Provost of St Mary's Cathedral, Edinburgh, points out that the statement by Mr Jones in his article on the "Harvest Festival" (October, 1942, p. 208) that "its liturgical status is dubious and undefined" needs some qualification. Within the Anglican Communion definite liturgical status is given to the observance at least in the Scottish Episcopal Church by the provision in its Prayer Book of special choir office lessons and psalms, and of a Eucharistic proper. He also says that the Mass for Ember Wednesday in September in the Roman Missal has incorporated in itself large fragments of an earlier Harvest Thanksgiving Mass. Moreover, "the prevalence of Masses *post collectas terræ fructus* to be found in seventeenth and eighteenth century French Missals is further evidence of the fact that special Harvest Thanksgivings have from early to recent times been a feature of liturgical life in the West."

Our appeal to subscribers to THEOLOGY in Britain who would be willing to send their copy each month, when they have read it, to a missionary overseas brought in a number of offers, which have all been used up. Mrs Vibert, 18, Camden Crescent, Bath, still has a waiting list of would-be recipients, and will be grateful to hear of further offers.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

G. ASH (Sittingbourne, Kent): *The Clergy and the Science of Life* (Tracts for the Church of England, No. 2) (3d.).
DACRE PRESS: T. M. Parker, *Prayer and Action* (1s.).
DAKERS: S. Miles, *Rabboni*, (8s. 6d.); V. Brittain, *Humiliation with Honour* (3s. 6d.); M. Plowman, *The Right to Live* (7s. 6d.).
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: S. Hobhouse, *Retribution and the Christian* (2d.); G. L. Phelps, *Christianity and the State* (4d.).
GLASGOW UNIVERSITY PRESS: T. S. Eliot, *The Music of Poetry* (1s. 6d.).
MOWBRAYS: B. Frost, *Some Modern Substitutes for Christianity* (3s. 6d.); E. R. McNeile, *From Theosophy to Christian Faith* (4s. 6d.).
NATIONAL SOCIETY AND S.P.C.K.: A. P. Taylor, *Prayer Book Worship* (3s. 6d.); K. F. Brown, *The Church's Part in Education*, 1833-1941 (7s. 6d.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: S. Kierkegaard, *Repetition* (14s.); E. T. Whittaker, *The Beginning and the End of the World* (2s. 6d.).
PAX HOUSE: G. D. Carleton, *The Mother of Jesus* (4s. 6d.).
S.C.M. PRESS: *Sylfeini'r Ffydd* (various contributors) (3s.).
S.P.C.K.: *Alternative Form of Holy Communion* (South Africa) (People's Edition, 3s. 6d.)
J. A. THOMPSON: R. F. Markham, *Present-Day Preaching of the Gospel* (2d.).
UNIVERSITY OF WALES PRESS BOARD: A. R. Johnson, *The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God* (2s.).

Printed in Great Britain by
Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher